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ABSTRACT
This article examines religious freedom in the People’s Republic of
China (PRC) using critical frame analysis of state and civil society
organisations’ (CSOs) policy discourse associated with the United
Nations (UN) Universal Periodic Review (UPR). The findings show
how indigenous Chinese CSOs’ input to the UPR is limited. Their
voice is muted, some merely mirror the rhetoric of the ruling
Chinese Communist Party (CCP). In contrast, international CSOs
are highly critical of what they see as state failure to uphold
religious freedom. The analysis reveals a significant disjuncture
between the policy discourse of international CSOs and the CCP.
The former’s discourse is framed in terms of: denial of rights,
imprisonment, legal failings, (re-)education, torture, and
persecution. In the absence of enforcement mechanisms, CCP
input to the UPR can be seen as part of a process of legitimation
and performativity; allowing the ruling elite to afford primacy to
what it dubs ‘a framework of socialism with Chinese
characteristics’ at the expense of religious freedoms.
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Introduction
Notwithstanding its status as a fundamental human right,1 the global rise of extremism
and associated threats has made the issue of religious freedom a key international issue.
In response, scholarly enquiry has underlined the centrality of regime type to religious
freedoms.2 This study addresses a lacuna by exploring religious freedom issues from a
civil society perspective in relation to the People’s Republic of China (PRC). The PRC
is a propitious research context because of international concerns over religious suppres-
sion3 and, the proscription of quasi-religions,4 such as Falun Gong (FLG).5 Such develop-
ments have thrown religious freedom issues into sharp relief.
Yet, according to the ruling Chinese Communist Party (CCP) elite, external criticism is
ill-founded. It asserts, it ‘safeguards its citizens’ freedom of religious belief, protects normal
religious activities, defends the lawful rights and interests of religious communities, and
assists them in resolving substantive difficulties’.6 Now is therefore a timely juncture to
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examine such matters; thereby addressing a key knowledge gap for, as Fenggang Yang’s
seminal study notes:
so far most of the scholarly attention to religious freedom in China has been on the formal
regulations and CCP policies… the least studied area is the actual practice and defense of
religious freedom by religious communities and civic organizations in civil society.7
‘Civil society’ here is defined as associational activities involving the family, non-gov-
ernmental organisations, pressure groups, charities, community groups, social movements
and campaigning organisations.8 These may operate within national boundaries. Yet, over
recent decades, a burgeoning literature has delineated the emergence of ‘global civil
society’. This (albeit contested) term denotes how, in various ways and forms, civil
society organisations (CSOs) increasingly, operate across national boundaries. As
Helmut Anheier and Nuno Themudo note: they are organisationally diverse and ‘range
from large-scale charities with hundreds of staff to transnational volunteer-run networks
with no real expenditures at all… ’.9 In all its forms, civil society is an appropriate locus of
enquiry in a number of regards. Foremost, it is the social arena in which associative life is
shaped by norms, practices and beliefs attached to faith. This influences social cohesion
and citizen trust in government,10 thereby shaping governmentality, political stability
and public administration,11 as well as economic and social development.12 It also
affects the extent to which international norms are embedded in local practices,13 and
the provision of community support and services.14 This in turn links to wider themes.
Notably, the nature of governance in China and how it is shaped by the interplay of inter-
national and domestic forces,15 as well as the nexus between democratisation and
development.16
To explore CSOs’ views on religious freedom in the PRC this study employs critical dis-
course analysis. It is a methodology that is supported by diverse strands of social theory
including the interpretive school of policy analysis17 and the literature on social construc-
tivism.18 Both place emphasis on language in order to reveal policy actors’ beliefs, values,
interpretations and knowledge relevant to addressing a given policy issue.19 The discourse
analysis has two components ‘framing’ and ‘issue salience’. The former derives from
Goffman and refers to a ‘schemata of interpretation’.20 Frames ‘render events or occur-
rences meaningful, [they] function to organise experience and guide action, whether indi-
vidual or collective’.21 Thus, framing is central to understanding rights and freedoms
involving multiple actors working across the public and civil spheres. In turn, ‘issue-sal-
ience’ is a technique borrowed from electoral studies22; it focuses on the level of attention
given to topics and frames amongst competing issues and agendas in political discourse.
The data source is CSO reports submitted to successive cycles of the UN’s Universal Per-
iodic Review (UPR). In short, this is a five-yearly assessment that incorporates CSOs’ sub-
missions on the extent to which governments uphold their human rights obligations;
specifically, for the present purposes, those in relation to religious freedom.
Accordingly, the core research aim is to compare and contrast civil society and Chinese
government discourse on religious freedom over two cycles of the UPR. The remainder of
the article is structured thus: following an overview of the literature on religious freedom
and civil society in China, and a summary of the methodology, analysis of state and civil
society UPR discourse is presented. The principal findings and their implications are dis-
cussed in the conclusion.
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Religious freedom and civil society in China
A full history of state policy on religion in China is out with the present purposes. Yet as
Guo and Zhang’s leading account details,23 the period following the Cultural Revolution
has been witness to some key changes. Foremost, state policy on religion needs to be seen
in the context of the priority the CCP attaches to political stability and the retention of
power: ‘promoting the unity of all people (believers and non-believers) and their efforts
to build a modern socialist country was the Party’s basic task; religious differences were
relatively secondary’.24 In consequence, in 1982 ‘protecting religious freedom’ was incor-
porated into the fourth edition of the constitution. Today, whilst government authorities
recognise five major religions (Buddhism, Taoism, Catholicism, Islam, and Protestant-
ism), to varying degrees, some other religious beliefs are tolerated. Indeed, according to
the government: ‘there are about 5,500 religious groups… along with nearly a hundred
religion-affiliated academic institutions and as many as 140,000 places of religious activity
… Religious clergy number some 360,000, and there are around 100 million believers’.25
Historically, the Republic of China was a signatory to the original UN Charter and the
UN Universal Declaration of Human Rights. In modern times the successor PRC is a sig-
natory to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) (1998). Under
this the PRC is expected to uphold Article 18 (1):
Everyone shall have the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion. This right shall
include freedom to have or to adopt a religion or belief of his [sic] choice, and freedom, either
individually or in community with others and in public or private, to manifest his [sic] reli-
gion or belief in worship, observance, practice and teaching.
However, almost two decades on, the PRC has yet to ratify the ICCPR. Despite this failing,
the Chinese authorities have ratiﬁed other binding UN treaties that include provisions
safeguarding religious freedom. A leading example is the UN Convention on the Rights
of the Child:
states Parties shall respect the right of the child to freedom of thought, conscience and reli-
gion… [and] shall respect the rights and duties of the parents and, when applicable, legal
guardians, to provide direction to the child in the exercise of his or her right (Article 14).
Another is the UN Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Racial Discrimination.26
Article 5(d, vii) is unambiguous and asserts ‘the right to freedom of thought, conscience
and religion’.
However, despite these obligations, as the following analysis affirms, the reality is one of
mixed progress. For example, a recent report by the UN concluded that:
notwithstanding the assurances provided by the State party delegation, the Committee
remains concerned about reports that members of some minority groups do not fully
enjoy freedom of religion… Taking into account the intersectionality between ethnicity
and religion, the Committee recommends that the State party ensure respect for the right
of members of all ethnic groups to freely enjoy freedom of religion.27
In addition to UN treaties, further safeguards are set out in the constitution. For
example, Article 36 provides that ‘the State protects normal religious activities’ (emphasis
added). Yet, as with the UN instruments, there are (non-)compliance issues. For example,
as Guobin Zhu cogently observes of Article 36, ‘what is regarded and defined as
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“abnormal” activities? [… it] may be easily subject to subjective and arbitrary interpret-
ation’.28 This issue of conditionality and interpretation also applies to the National
Human Rights Action Plan passed by the State Council in 2012.29 It re-emphasises the
principle of freedom of religious belief (‘China upholds the principle of freedom of reli-
gious belief stipulated in the Constitution and strictly implements the Regulations on Reli-
gious Affairs to guarantee citizens’ freedom of religious belief’), as well as the goal of
‘protecting normal religious activities according to law’. However, it also includes an
opaque clause; namely, that ‘the Action Plan was formulated in line with the following
basic principles… The principle of pursuing practicality’. The issue of what is deemed
‘practical’ is not defined.
Against this backdrop, contemporary accounts of religious freedom in China indeed
paint a mixed picture. In the case of Christianity and other faiths. There are some positive
assessments. For example, Changgang Guo and Fengmei Zhang observe ‘the CCP’s con-
temporary religious policy is still deeply misunderstood’.30 Moreover, longitudinal survey
data on citizens’ subjective evaluation of political changes found that more than half of
respondents reported that they believed freedom of religion had improved.31
In contrast, an opposing literature asserts that when religious (and ‘quasi-religious’)
organisations are felt to pose a threat to CCP power and stability, oppression and rights
denial are a reality. As one account puts it, although the CCP has asserted ‘Christianity
[i]s compatible with [it’s] vision of China as a “harmonious society” [it…] has continued
to preach atheism and places restrictions on faith’.32 Extant work also details how other
beliefs are subject to oppression, notably Muslim Uyghurs in Xinjiang.33 In the case of
quasi-religions such as Falun Gong, surveillance, security operations, ‘interrogation and con-
version programs in prisons and labor reform institutions’ are widespread.34 In short, critics
argue that the ruling elite has adopted an ‘instrumentalist approach of law-making, [one
that] tends to restrict the exercise of religious freedom to serve a political agenda’.35
Overall, this burgeoning literature suggests that the PRC is a context in which ‘the
process of identification of “evil cult” is rather selective, and mainly based on political con-
siderations’.36 As one account explains, the ‘severe repression’ of Falun Gong arose
because it:
triggered alarm bells within the CCP for two reasons. First, the Party realized that the move-
ment was proving more powerful in undermining the ideology of the state than any orga-
nized religion. Secondly, Falun Gong persistently demanded freedom of assembly, which
was something the Party could not tolerate.37
Overall, in the period since 2005, the PRC has seen the relaxation of some aspects of
state regulation of religion. Yet, as Ani Sarkissian’s account explains, state Regulations
on Religious Affairs (RRA):
continue to restrict and repress religions in a number of ways: CCP members are still required
to declare their atheism… religious bodies are still required to register with government… the
government may still refuse registration to any group for any reason without justification…
[and] all sites for religious activities must be registered with the government… .38
In sum, the literature on religious freedom and civil society in China is a polarised one.
One strand points to the language of the constitution and CCP pronouncements, arguing
that claims of oppression are overstated. The other provides accounts of widespread
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suppression. What is missing is a systematic analysis of civil society’s discourse on the
issue juxtaposed with that of the ruling elite. Attention now shifts to how the present
study addresses that gap.
Methodology
This study uses critical discourse analysis with an examination of issue salience and policy
‘framing’. The latter can be viewed as ‘a necessary property of a text – where text is broadly
conceived to include discourses, patterned behaviour, and systems of meaning, policy
logics, constitutional principles, and deep cultural narratives’.39 In the present analysis,
frames in the UPR texts were coded using an inductive coding schemata based on key
frames taken from the UNDHR (including: ‘rights/freedoms’, ‘detention’, ‘education’,
‘torture/violence’, ‘persecution/oppression’, and ‘discrimination’).40 In addition, the prin-
cipal frames in the discourse were further analysed to identify tropes. These are crosscut-
ting ‘figures of speech and argument that give persuasive power to larger narratives
[including frames] of which they are part’.41
Frame use was quantified by drawing upon the notion of ‘issue-salience’. This measures
the level of attention to a given topic or frame amongst competing issues and agendas in
the discourse. It is determined by content analysis, or the frequency of key words, ideas or
meanings in policy documents.42 This was done by adapting a procedure derived from
electoral studies, whereby texts are divided into ‘quasi-sentences’ (or, ‘an argument
which is the verbal expression of one political idea or issue’. To operationalize, the
mixed methodology electronic versions of the UPR submission documents were analysed
in relation to discourse on religious freedoms using appropriate software.43 To increase
reliability the coding was repeated by a research assistant. This revealed a limited
number of discrepancies. In total, seven incidences were identified (under 1%) these
were resolved through discussion between coders.
As noted, the data source was the CSO reports and Chinese government submissions to
the first and second cycle UPRs in 2009 and 2013. A total of 112 CSO reports were ana-
lysed. The extant literature distinguishes between indigenous, ‘grassroots’ CSOs and inter-
national CSOs (‘global civil society’). A recent study offered an assessment of the
challenges facing indigenous CSOs in China (here termed NGOs – or ‘non-governmental
organisations’), ‘Grassroots NGOs survive only insofar as they refrain from democratic
claims-making and address social needs that might fuel grievances against the state
… ’44 Crucially, CSOs concerned with the issue of human rights and religious freedom
fall outside the foregoing notion of ‘contingent symbiosis’, for they are largely concerned
with criticality and challenging state practices.
In response, the present research design controls for CSO type. The working hypothesis
here is that, compared to CSOs based outside mainland China, ‘indigenous’ CSOs are poten-
tially more constrained and less critical in their submissions for fear of state reprisals.
Accordingly, the dataset was divided into two categories: ‘indigenous CSOs’ (37) and inter-
national CSOs (75). Members of the former category were identified by the postal addresses
given in the UPR submission (or, in a minority of instances where this was absent, by an
internet search of organisational details linked to the CSO name). The second sub-set of
international CSOs was a diverse grouping who were headquartered in another
jurisdiction.45
THE INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF HUMAN RIGHTS 5
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
by
 [1
47
.14
7.6
2.2
42
] a
t 0
2:4
2 2
3 N
ov
em
be
r 2
01
7 
State UPR discourse on the right to freedom of religious belief
In its national reports submitted to the UPR in 2009 and 2013, the government of the
PRC’s discourse on religious freedoms is mainly descriptive in character, offering little
more than a basic recitation of legal and constitutional instruments. Problems and chal-
lenges are unacknowledged. For example:
The Constitution expressly provides that citizens enjoy freedom to believe or not to believe in
any religion. No State organ, organization or individual may force citizens to believe or not to
believe in any religion, nor may they discriminate against citizens who believe or do not
believe in any religion.46
The discourse also includes basic statistics, (for example, ‘the number of Muslims profes-
sing the Islamic faith has increased from 18 million in 1997 to 21 million’, etc.); as well as
examples of state funding for religious organisations (for example, ‘beginning in 2009, the
funds provided by the Chinese Government to religious communities for the maintenance
and repair of temples and other places of worship were increased to 20 million yuan, and
again in 2011 to 30 million yuan’).47
The most important passage is contained in the 2013 UPR submission. It sets out the
ruling CCP’s position on religious freedoms:
The Chinese Government is working to explore paths for human rights development, estab-
lishing a robust system of human rights safeguards, and continuously enriching the theory of
human rights, all within the framework of socialism with Chinese characteristics… It coor-
dinates and promotes the safeguarding of civil, political, social, and cultural rights as well as
the rights of special groups… to ensure that every citizen enjoys a life of ever-greater dignity,
freedom and well-being.48
In conceptual terms, this is signiﬁcant for it signals cultural relativism (or, the need to
adapt the UNDHR to the different cultures applying in different states). This is evident
in the telling phrase ‘within the framework of socialism with Chinese characteristics’.
Thus, the state discourse is unambiguous. It conﬁrms that rights implementation in the
PRC is to be qualiﬁed. It will be on the CCP’s terms.
There is also evidence of dissembling in the state reports. For example,
all normal religious duties performed by the clergy, such as the normal religious activities
carried out in places of worship or believers’ homes in accordance with religious custom,
are regulated by religious organizations and the believers themselves; these activities are pro-
tected by law and may not be interfered with by any person.49
Here, the state discourse is again qualified by undefined terms. In this case, ‘normal’
religious activities. Also absent is any reference to the Regulations on Religious Affairs,
the requirement for CCP members to declare atheism, religious bodies to register with
the government, government’s right to refuse registration for any reason, and the require-
ment that all sites for religious activities must be registered with the government.
The state reports also contain annexes for the Special Administrative Regions of Macao
and Hong Kong. Strikingly, these contain no specific reference to religious freedoms.
Instead, the language is generalised. It alludes to ‘minorities’ and ‘fostering in the commu-
nity a culture of mutual understanding, tolerance and respect’.50 On the religious freedoms
of ethnic minorities, the state discourse is often directly at odds with extant scholarly
analysis, as well as UN reports. For example, in its first-cycle UPR report, the ruling
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CCP elite stated, ‘China safeguards the right of ethnic minorities to use and develop their
own spoken and written languages, endeavours to protect their cultures and respects their
customs, habits and religious beliefs’.51 Yet analysis of the situation in Xinjiang reveals
that, in addition to Uyghur language tuition being outlawed in universities, it is increas-
ingly uncommon in secondary and primary schools. In turn, as a leading scholarly
account notes, such practices are fuelling ‘a feeling of victim-hood created by domestic
Chinese oppression (and repression), combined with an empathy for similarly
“oppressed” peoples in the Middle East’.52
In the case of Tibet, the Chinese government discourse is also instrumental in nature. It
alludes to compliance with the UNDHR. It refers to,
fully respecting freedom of religious belief in ethnic regions in Tibet, the manner of succes-
sion of the reincarnated Living Buddha is fully respected, and traditional religious activities
proceed normally… Tibetan cultural customs and practices continue to be handed down and
protected.53
This contrasts with a raft of academic studies. For example:
the Tibetans and the Uyghurs, experience severe limitations when they want to practice their
traditional religion.… The intense fear of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) of a possible
link between religion and ethnic separatism has put many restraints on the constitutional
guarantees of the right to freedom of religious belief in Tibet and Xinjiang.54
The state discourse is also at odds with academic analysis of succession issues. Here, as
Adrien Frossard cogently observes: ‘the most likely succession scenario is one of pro-
tracted fight for legitimacy… the possibility of an agreement between the exiles and the
Chinese authorities on this matter is ruled out’.55
Two conceptual strands help explain the Chinese state UPR discourse. The first, instru-
mentalism, draws on the philosophy of John Dewey,56 and privileges ideas and language as
instruments of action. Their worth is gauged by their usefulness to a given end. It is an
approach that emphasises pragmatism, practical purpose and adjustment.57 Applied to
the present case, China’s discourse is instrumental in the sense that it seeks to affirm
current practice in the PRC as consistent with the countries’ obligations under UN
rights instruments in order to satisfy the administrative requirements of the UPR;
whether or not this is actually the case. In doing this, the discourse presents an
example of institutional decoupling. In other words, the situation whereby state elites
espouse one thing but do another. This results in contradiction, inconsistency and a
gap between policy rhetoric and delivery.58
Civil society organisations’ UPR discourse on right to freedom of religious
belief
(A). Indigenous CSOs
UPR submissions from indigenous CSOs constitute under a third (31%) of the total of 112
reports studied. They were analysed separately in line with the working hypothesis that
CCP constraints would undermine and limit their criticality, resulting in contrasts in
the framing and issue salience (compared to international CSOs). Recent insightful
work by Taco Brandsen and Ruth Simsanon describes the prevailing context:
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non-profit organizations [CSOs] also face criticism as they operate in closer relationships
with the state than would be common for their Western counterparts, within narrow
limits defined by the state that tend to restrict dissenting voices… Civic engagement is
encouraged in order to maintain regime stability rather than to increase participation.59
In a similar vein, Zhang Yuanfeng’s penetrating account also alludes to how the
Chinese state is ‘seeking to retain a degree of control over non-profit operations… in
the highly constrained atmosphere of th[e] biggest remaining socialist country’.60
The impact of this distinctive context is reflected in the indigenous CSOs’ discourse
which is revealed to be qualitatively different to that of international CSOs. Accordingly,
as the following textual analysis confirms, the working hypothesis is proven. The circum-
scribed nature of civil society–state relations is evident in the fact that only five of the indi-
genous CSO reports make direct reference to issues of religious freedom in the UPR
submissions. Of the latter, the discourse is largely uncritical and supportive of the
status quo. This is in stark contrast to the excoriating criticism in the discourse of inter-
national CSOs (see below). Discourse analysis reveals that the indigenous CSOs’ discourse
often emulates CCP rhetoric. For example:
It is the best time now for China to implement the right to freedom of religious belief set forth
by the Constitution and the relevant religious policies formulated by the Chinese government
… In general, it is an obvious fact that all religious groups, religious believers and nonbelievers
get along well with each other, understand and forgive each other. With progress of its mod-
ernization, pluralism of its economic structure and diversification of its spiritual culture, China
has provided more loose space for the development of various religions’ cultures.61
Weighed against the graphic accounts of suppression and violence, the ‘indigenous’ dis-
course provides a striking contrast. For example,
various religions, religious sects and believers and non-believers in Tibet respect each other
and live in harmony. The monks have established committees of democratic management
through democratic elections to exercise independent management of religious affairs and
arrange religious activities… This fully demonstrates that believers and laymen alike in
Tibet have truly gained religious freedom and basic human rights.62
There is limited evidence of ‘indigenous’ CSO criticality. Where it exists it is often
muted in tone. For example,
In some occasion [sic] the local governments and officials may hurt the feelings of religious fol-
lowers and infringe on their legitimate rights and interests when formulating and implementing
laws and policies [we…] suggest that the government should pay more attention to the spiritual
demand[s] of various groups of people during the period of social transformation… .63
Isolated references are made to ‘Chinese government security monitoring and control-
ling of… religious cult members’.64 These though are the exception and examples of CSO
criticism of CCP policies are rare.
(B). International CSOs
In contrast, as the following analysis reveals, international CSOs’ UPR submissions are
caustic in their criticism of what they view as CCP suppression of religious freedom.
When the discourse in the submissions is disaggregated by frame there is consistency in
the lead frames across both UPR cycles (Table 1). In other words, the same three
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Table 1. Breakdown of framing in state and civil society organisations’ discourse – with example text
(N = 381).
FRAME
STATE
%
CSO
% STATE EXAMPLE TEXT CSO EXAMPLE TEXT
LGBT rights (generic) 0.0 28.4 – ‘Despite the constitutional prohibition
on discrimination, the work of civil
society organisations working to
protect the rights of sexual
minorities remains particularly
imperilled in Russia’ (‘Golos’
Association for Voters’ Rights,
2012, 4).
(anti)-Discrimination 13.0 18.5 ‘Russian law prohibits restrictions of
any kind on citizens’ rights on the
basis of social, racial, sexual, ethnic,
linguistic, religious or any other
affiliation; it is thus impossible for a
policy of discrimination against
individual groups of citizens to
emerge. There are administrative
and criminal penalties for
discrimination’ (19, para. 175).
‘Administrative bodies refuse to
warrant official permits for LGBT-
related events justifying their
decisions by discriminatory
judgments’ (Russian LGBT Network,
2012, 5).
Hate crimes/ ‘homo’-
phobic bullying/
violence
0.0 11.0 – ‘Often law-enforcement officers resort
to unwarranted violence in the
absence of any threats to public
order on the part of the protesters.
General violence and violent
detainments often extend to the
journalists covering the event and
human rights observers’ (Centre for
the Development of Democracy and
Human Rights et al., 2013, 3).
Fundamental
freedoms/of
opinion and
expression
41.3 15.2 ‘The Constitution guarantees every
citizen freedom of speech. No one
may be forced to express or
renounce his or her opinions and
convictions. Everyone has the right
freely to seek, obtain, transfer,
produce and disseminate
information by any legitimate
means’ (14, para. 124).
‘The Russian LGBT Network stated that
local media had stopped covering
its activities because they were
afraid of being sued. In many cases,
owners of local media would not be
in a position to pay fines if found
guilty of violating the law’ (ILGA-
Europe, 2012, 2).
Identity 0.0 7.2 – Russian authorities deny the existence
of the problem with discrimination
on grounds of sexual orientation
and gender identity and take no
measures to combat homophobia in
the society and prevent hate crimes
on grounds of sexual orientation
and gender identity’ (Center for
Social and Labor Rights et al., 2012,
3).
Morality/values 0.0 6.9 ‘Preserving… traditional ways of life
and values, by using targeted
support from the State’ (20, para.
187).
‘These violations are manifested in
refusals of registration not only on
formal grounds but also using the
arguments of morality, traditional
family values, etc.’ (‘Perspektiva’
Regional NGO of Persons with
Disabilities, LGBT Network, 2012, 6).
Freedom of assembly 13.0 6.6 ‘Under article 30 of the Constitution,
everyone has the right to associate,
including the right to form trade
unions for the protection of their
interests. Voluntary associations are
‘Such laws run counter to everyone’s
right to freedom of expression as
well as the closely related rights to
freedom of association and to
peaceful assembly. They are simply
(Continued )
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frames gain most attention in both the 2009 and 2013 CSO reports. This is significant
because it shows the endurance of key rights issues, indicates limited progress and reflects
continuing CSO dissatisfaction. Accordingly, the lead frame is ‘denial of rights/freedoms’
which accounts for just under a third of quasi-sentences overall (31.5%). The second is
‘imprisonment/detention/detainment’; this accounts for just under a fifth of all references
(19.2%). The third is ‘shortcomings in legal matters’ (11.2%). The nature of the discourse
in relation to specific frames is now considered.
The lead frame is ‘denial of rights’. Reflecting what the CSOs view as a deepening
problem, it is subject to increased attention over the first and second UPR cycles (rising
from 27.9% to 35.5% of quasi-sentences). Textual analysis shows CSOs’ awareness of insti-
tutional decoupling – (or the gap between state rhetoric and reality), and how the primacy
of the CCP’s socialist vision and desire to retain power shapes policy and practice. For
example:
Despite its official policy of respect for the freedom of religion, China’s overarching concern
is ensuring the adaption of religion in order to ‘safeguard the security, honour and interests of
the motherland’,65 a requirement which renders the freedom of religion illusionary. China
requires that religious belief is practised in a way that accepts the leadership of the Party
above all else.66
The perceived denial of rights to ‘unofﬁcial’ religious groups and ethnic minorities is also
highlighted repeatedly. For example, one CSO describes, ‘ongoing crackdowns against
ethnic minorities, members of non-state-sanctioned religious groups, petitioners and
human rights defenders [… these] violate fundamental rights to life, liberty and security
of the person’.67 The civil society discourse also emphasises the scale and intensity of
what is viewed as state-sponsored religious rights-denial. For example, one employs the
Table 1. Continued.
FRAME
STATE
%
CSO
% STATE EXAMPLE TEXT CSO EXAMPLE TEXT
guaranteed freedom to act’ (15,
para. 139).
not legitimate restrictions under
international law’ (ILGA-Europe,
2012, 7).
Health 4.3 3.0 Work is now in progress [to … ]
improve levels of health care and
education’ (20, para. 189).
‘The problem with provision of access
to specialized medical care for
transgender people does not
receive proper attention of public
health administration authorities’
(Lgbtnet, 2012, 4).
Equality in
workplace/ labour
market
10.9 2.1 ‘The Russian Federation is based on
the principle that the peoples of the
Federation enjoy equal rights’ (19,
para. 177).
‘39.7% (356 persons) experienced
difficulties at their work in
connection with their sexual
orientation … ’ (Russian LGBT
Network, 2012, 5).
Equality in housing,
education and
social welfare
17.4 1.2 ‘The most important pointers followed
in designing and carrying out
national strategy for social security
and improving the welfare of the
population are the International
Covenant on Economic, Social and
Cultural Rights and the United
Nations Millennium Declaration. By
the end of 2011… the State was
fully assuming all its social
obligations’ (16, para. 151).
‘Prohibiting the dissemination of any
information on sexual diversity. This
would curtail the activities of
organisations that provide
information and counselling on
sexual and reproductive health,
including prevention of sexually
transmittable infections’ (Institute
for Human Rights, ‘Social
Partnership’ Foundation, 2012, 7).
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powerful language of the UN charter itself: ‘the PRC government’s severe and extensive
violations against Falun Gong practitioners are precisely what the Universal Declaration
of Human Rights (UDHR) calls “barbarous acts which have outraged the conscience of
mankind”’.68 It continues, ‘such acts go against the letter and spirit of the UN Charter,
and violate every article of the UDHR and all international human rights treaties’.69
Even for ofﬁcially recognised faiths, some CSOs paint a picture of repression. For
example, ‘the Chinese authorities have imposed political and religious policies that that
have been against the principles and practices of the Catholic faith, and they have
gravely violated human rights… ’70
Over the first and second UPR cycles there is also increased attention to the second
frame, ‘detention/imprisonment’ (rising from 17.8% to 20.8% of quasi-sentences). The
CSO discourse emphasises that detention and imprisonment are not exceptional, but
widespread phenomena. One CSO sought to quantify its prevalence:
the Chinese Government regularly arrests and imprisons religious adherents who, in turn,
claim that such arrests were based on their religious practices…According to the Law Year-
book of China, 8,224 cases of disturbing the social order or cheating by the use of superstition
were filed.71
Others underlined the impact of detention on individual faiths. For example: ‘China’s
human rights record is one of the worst in the world… there are more Christians in prison
in China than any other country in the world. The only legal churches are those strictly
controlled by the government’.72 However, it is the detention of Falun Gong followers
that receives most attention in the UPR submissions. For example, ‘reflecting a continued
[state] commitment to wipe out the practice, the CCP launches regular, nationwide efforts
to eradicate FLG through propaganda, imprisonment, torture, and forced conversion’.73
Notably, CSOs underline how domestic law (inter alia, security laws and, failure to reg-
ister religious groups) are used as a pretext for detention. For example, one CSO noted,
‘China has used the Criminal Law… to justify holding prisoners under house arrest or
in undisclosed locations even after they have completed their sentence’.74 The discourse
also details CSOs’ concern that detention not only affects individuals directly, but also
those that represent them in law. For example, one cited the case of a lawyer ‘known
for his work in defence of Falun Gong practitioners and religious rights… detained for
almost two months. His whereabouts are unclear’.75 A further core trope is the situation
in PRC-administered Tibet. For example, one CSO argued that,
monks and nuns make up approximately 58 per cent of the political prisoner population…
[Adding that…] 824 Tibetan political or religious prisoners [are] believed to be currently
detained or imprisoned. Of these 824 Tibetans, 479 are monks, nuns, or reincarnate lamas.76
The third frame, ‘shortcomings in legal matters’, is also subject to increased attention
over the first and second UPR cycles (rising from 9.1% to 13.4% of references). A core
strand of the discourse is CSOs’ view that legal and constitutional guarantees of religious
freedom are not being upheld. For example, one asserted that ‘religious freedom abuses in
China… primarily result from the government’s failure to enforce religious freedom guar-
antees and the prevalence of religiously motivated violence… the Chinese government
continues to perpetrate religious abuses on a variety of religious groups’.77 The state’s
failure to ratify the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) is also
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subject to repeated criticism. For example, one CSO argued that the absence of ratification
‘should not stop China from protecting and preventing any possible violation of human
rights, [yet…] unlawful practice by the court is a common phenomenon’.78 Other
CSOs highlighted a paradox whereby, they argued, the contemporary prevalence of reli-
gious persecution was itself a barrier to ICCPR ratification. One observed, it ‘would
also be impeded by the continued widespread criminal prosecutions of individuals for
exercising their rights to free expression, association and assembly, [and] to freedom of
religion and belief’.79
Further core tropes under the ‘legal matters’ frame include arbitrary procedures and the
absence of due process. For example, one CSO referred to how ‘the ability to practice and
express religious faith is hindered by inconsistent local enforcement of the laws [on reli-
gious freedom]’.80 Another alluded to how some members of religious groups are ‘not pro-
secuted under the criminal justice system… essential procedural safeguards must be
upheld: laws should not be used to punish people on the basis of their “anti-social” behav-
iour as assessed by non-judicial bodies’.81
Attention to the fourth frame ‘(re-)education’ declined slightly over the UPR cycles
(from 9.1% to 5.8% of quasi-sentences). The frame has two related strands: ‘regular’ edu-
cation (formal and informal, comprising schooling as well as higher education); and re-
education. The latter is a punitive, corrective process instigated by the state and intended
to make individuals revise their attitudes and beliefs to be compliant with CCP mores. The
CSO discourse recounts how the latter practice also applies to lawyers defending individ-
uals falling foul of the governing authorities. As one CSO notes, ‘the Re-education through
Labour system has been used to facilitate the incarceration of… human rights defenders,
and individuals who practice their religion outside official channels’.82
Again, the UPR discourse underlines the particular patterns and processes of alleged
repression in Tibet. For example:
patriotic re-education (PRE), a compulsory programme, which aims to quash loyalty to the
Dalai Lama and Tibetan nationalist feelings… It seeks to change fundamental elements of
thought, conscience and religious belief. Historically, patriotic re-education campaigns
were aimed at monasteries and nunneries, but it has been extended to schools, institutions
of higher education and locations of protest since 2008.83
A further core trope is re-education of Falun Gong followers. For example: ‘the auth-
orities operate hundreds of “Legal Education Training Centres” across the country, often
referred to as “brainwashing centres”, designed specifically for the “transformation” of
Falun Gong practitioners, where they are coerced into renouncing their beliefs’.84
The ‘torture/beatings’ frame has been subject to increased CSO attention over the two
UPR cycles (from 6.1% to 7.0% of references). Such discourse is extensive and applied to a
range of religious groups, including state-recognised faiths. For example, one CSO alluded
to the fact that, in its view, ‘urgent human rights concerns in the PRC include… forced
confessions and torture in the justice system… persecution of religious believers who
refuse to join state-controlled churches’.85 However, Falun Gong followers are the most
prominent group identified as being at risk of such practices. For example, one CSO
referred graphically to how ‘practitioners arrested have suffered several forms of
torture, including beatings, electric baton shocks, hanging for hours to days, deprivation
of sleep for days… ’86 In a similar vein, another alluded to the fact that
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the use of torture against FLG practitioners in China remains widespread and systematic.
Reports… continue to be received from contacts in China on a daily basis. Torture is used
primarily for the purpose of forced religious conversion, as well as to extract information
on the whereabouts and activities of other individuals.87
A further strand under this frame concerned what CSOs viewed as the obvious ‘discon-
nect’ between treaty obligations and contemporary practice. Notably, one underlined how,
China’s active seeking of a reservation from the UN Convention against Torture has
allowed the violent practice to endure:
political activists, religious minorities, and women continue to be subjects of torture and
other persecution… China ratified the Convention against Torture on 4th October 1988,
[but] with a reservation to Article 20. Under this reservation the Chinese Government
does not authorize the Committee against Torture to investigate allegations of torture in
China.88
In the case of the sixth frame, ‘persecution/oppression’, the discourse paints a worrying
picture. One CSO observed, ‘the Chinese authorities continue to criminally punish and to
use illegal, arbitrary and violent methods to intimidate and persecute individuals for the
peaceful exercise of their… right to freedom of expression, religion, belief, association
and assembly’.89 Others alluded to the way that state officials clamp down on unregistered
groups including quasi-religions or cults: ‘the need for national security is being used as a
pretext for religious persecution… ’90 The comments of CSOs also underline the lack of
enforcement of policy of the UN rights framework. For example, expressing frustration
over the absence of progress since the First Cycle, one opined, the ‘Chinese government
persecutes religious practitioners and political dissidents… in 2009, the first UPR cycle
reviewed China…However, [named cases] have lasted for 14 years, the persecution
still occurs constantly’.91
CSOs’ negative assessment of the denial of religious freedom in the PRC is evident in
their discourse under the state ‘control/restriction’ frame. As one CSO complained,
China only allows groups registered with the government… to legally hold worship services.
[Some…] religious groups are not permitted to register as legal entities, while some [other]
religious and spiritual groups are outlawed completely. Proselytizing in public or unregis-
tered places of worship is forbidden.92
Thus, the discourse describes a societal context in which ‘unregistered religious groups
face intense pressure to register, and suffer severe consequences if they refuse’.93 State
monitoring is widespread and systemic in nature; as the following example reveals: ‘the
laws stipulate that new religious centres may only be developed with state permission
through a registration process. This process allows the state to monitor religious activities
… Such state-led intervention is contradictory to an atmosphere of religious freedom’.94
Others contend that, far from liberalising the situation, the 2005 Regulations on Religious
Affairs have
allowed the state to tighten some aspects of its control over religion, despite official claims to
the contrary. It allows for local officials to arbitrarily arrest believers, close places of worship,
and place restrictions on the movement and action of clergy.95
The plight of ethnic groups has gained increasing attention over UPR cycles. The CSO
submissions set out why, in their view, minorities are subject to religious oppression. For
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example, one lamented that, ‘the Government’s… identification of Tibetans, Uyghurs,
and Mongols’ assertions of cultural, religious, or ethnic identity, as separatist or splittist,
compounds the discrimination against, and disenfranchisement of, these ethnic groups’.96
The UPR discourse describes numerous cases of oppression, as typified by these examples:
‘a Uyghur and Christian house church leader, was arrested and his family was told it was a
“national security issue” […whilst] another house church leader in Xinjiang was detained,
this time for “inciting separatism”’.97
In turn, China’s management of Tibet is founded on the CCP’s position that, owing to
its link to the Dalai Lama, religious belief is antagonistic to both socialism and the Chinese
state. It is a view captured in the discourse of several CSOs. For example, one noted that:
‘in Tibetan areas, the government has responded to a string of 101 self-immolations pro-
testing repressive policies since February 2009 with increased restrictions on movements,
communication, expression and religion’.98 Moreover, the CSOs highlighted the continu-
ing and deepening nature of the problem: ‘there is clear evidence… that there is a direct
correlation between the self-immolations and unrest in Tibet and an intensified campaign
against the Dalai Lama combined with the expansion of legal measures tightening state
control over Tibetan religion’.99
The civil society discourse also highlights legal measures taken by the Chinese state that
directly contradict the account it gave in its submission to the UPR about religious succes-
sion (see above). For example, one CSO noted that the,
‘[Tibetan Autonomous Region] TAR Measures for Implementation of the Regulations on
Religious Affairs’ was passed, placing the responsibility for picking and educating all
future Panchen lamas… in the hands of the government. This effectively gives them
control over the future leadership of the religion.100
Somewhat forlornly, the CSO discourse also appeals for a stronger monitoring role for
the UN. For example,
Area of Concern: Compliance with United Nations Human Rights Mechanisms. China must
meet agreements for other [UN] Special Rapporteurs to visit, including the Special Rappor-
teur on Religious Freedom, and accept that such visits must include Tibet as an area of
specific concern.101
The case of Tibet also illustrates CSOs’ use of the next frame: ‘protest’. Thus, for
example, one observed that, ‘sweeping new measures [have been] introduced… to
purge monasteries of monks and restrict religious practice in the wake of protests
across the plateau [… such developments] reveal a systematic new attack on Tibetan Bud-
dhism that is reminiscent of the Cultural Revolution’.102 Another recounted that: ‘the gov-
ernment, deploying large numbers of security forces, did not distinguish between violent
and peaceful demonstrators, and […] accused the Dalai Lama of being behind the
protests’.103
Article 7 of the UNCHR proscribes ‘discrimination’. CSO submissions over both UPR
cycles are framed in a way that highlights the widespread and intersectional nature of
faith-related discrimination in the PRC. ‘Intersectionality’ here refers to the need for
more sophisticated policy responses that deal with discrimination stemming from the
intersection between multiple, simultaneous protected characteristics (for example,
gender and faith, ethnicity and faith, etc.).104 Notwithstanding its pervasive nature,
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there is no mention of it in Chinese government UPR reports. In contrast, it receives
extensive attention in the civil society discourse. One strand concentrates on discrimi-
nation in the workplace and public sphere. For example,
discrimination is also present in Xinjiang’s administrative and business employment sector,
in which the ‘distinctive’ religious, dietary, and linguistic characteristics of Muslims are used
as a pretext to deny them access to positions of responsibility on the grounds that the
employing unit is ‘inadequately equipped’ to meet their special needs.105
The intersectionality of gender, religious belief and ethnicity are also prominent tropes.
For example, ‘Tibetan women live under severe restrictions to their political, religious,
reproductive, and social freedoms. There is a severe lack of fundamental human rights,
despite the establishment of the Beijing Platform for Action (BPfA) in 1995’.106
As with the other frames, the discourse underlines CSOs’ deep-felt frustration at the
lack of progress between UPR cycles. For example,
China’s Promotion of Religious Discrimination… The 2009 UPR expressed concern that
‘Chinese officials continue to repress religious activities considered to be outside the State-
controlled religious system’. This concern is prominent throughout the… 2009 UPR…
However, the Working Group did not address China’s religious repression in any of its
forty-two recommendations.107
The discourse under the ‘(freedom of) movement/assembly’ frame details CSOs’ views
on the Chinese state’s use of restrictions on believers’ mobility as a form of control and
religious oppression. The diverse accounts illustrate how this applies across religious
groups. For example, ‘prominent church leaders of a main house church in Gansu Pro-
vince remain detained after Chinese security forces raided a worship service… apparently
on charges of “gathering in an illegal assembly under the guise of religion”’.108 In the case
of followers of Islam, ‘the Chinese government has instituted controls over…what version
of the Koran and other religious texts may be used, where religious gatherings may be held,
and what may be said on religious occasions’.109
A final strand of the discourse details CSO views on state surveillance of religious group
members. The widespread nature of the practice is a core trope in the discourse. For
example, one UPR submission refers to how ‘FLG practitioners throughout China con-
tinue to be subjected to systematic surveillance of their movements, arbitrary searches
of their homes, and monitoring of private communications’.110 Accounts also detail
how associates of individual believers are targeted by the authorities. For example, one
account recalls the treatment of a human rights lawyer, stating that since ‘he sent out
three open letters to President Hu Jintao and Premier Wen Jiabao in 2005 demanding
the government stop oppressing liberal religious believers…His family has been under
severe surveillance’.111 The discourse also details how state surveillance extends to new
media. For example, one CSO recounted how ‘several internet platforms were set up…
but were closed one by one… online links are being kept under surveillance: the infor-
mations [sic] filtered, messages deleted, online chat and blogs blocked’.112
Discussion
The foregoing makes an original contribution in two respects: (1) by showing how indi-
genous Chinese CSOs’ input to the UPR is limited. Inter alia, their voice is muted and
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some merely mirror the rhetoric of the ruling CCP. (2) Revealing that, in contrast, inter-
national CSOs are highly critical of what they see as state failure to uphold religious
freedom. The lead frames in their UPR discourse include: denial of rights, imprisonment,
legal failings, (re-)education, torture, and persecution. Whilst regime theory suggests that,
as with other international agreements, human rights treaties are signed with the bona fide
intention that a country will implement their provisions to benefit its citizens.113 The
present findings suggest this is a view that must be treated with caution. It downplays
the reality that ruling elites may sign without full intent to comply. Rather they do so
in order ‘to appease a domestic or international constituency’.114 In addition, two
further, (non-discrete) factors are pivotal: the strength of civil society and international
enforcement of human rights. In the latter regard, UN treaties have notoriously weak
policy levers – and sanctions for non-compliance are limited.115 Whilst, in the former
case, as liberal internationalist theory underlines, ‘improvement in human rights is typi-
cally more likely the more democratic the country… [In short,] ratification [of human
rights treaties] is more beneficial the stronger a country’s civil society is’.116 The troubling
upshot is that in ‘autocratic regimes with weak civil society, [human rights treaty] ratifica-
tion can be expected to have no effect and is even possibly associated with more rights
violations’.117 The result is that shaming is often the strongest mechanism of human
rights enforcement, but international shaming is viewed by the PRC as ‘interference in
internal affairs’. Moreover, the malaise is compounded by the fact that, as noted, civil
society in the PRC is weak and strongly contained. That said, it could be argued that
the constitution of the PRC defends ‘freedom of belief’ (xinyang) and, in common with
practice in other jurisdictions, religious activity requires regulation by the state.
However, in the Chinese case the basic division is between inner belief and external
activity (the latter defined as anything involving more than one person). One could con-
ceivably construe the ICCPR in these terms. Yet, even this narrow interpretation is at odds
with the UN rights framework – for, as the Office for the High Commissioner for Human
Rights’ General Comment 22 (the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion
(Art. 18): 30/07/93, CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.4) makes clear, religion involves buildings,
ceremonies, holidays, food and clothing.118 Therefore it cannot be purely private.
Thus the problem lies in the way that the PRC chooses to interpret its obligations.
‘Normal’ religious activity is precisely an ‘activity within a norm, defined by the law’.
Here the Chinese attitude is partly immemorial, reflecting earlier imperial practice,
partly an over-borrowing of the notion of state sovereignty, yet crucially, without its
other face, that is, human rights. Given that in general Chinese law was criminal law, it
is hard for China to understand the sphere of civil law. In traditional China, family
clans enjoyed a certain autonomy within the state but were regulated by the rites and tra-
dition. In the PRC, today this sphere no longer exists in its traditional form. When law
steps in it does so as criminal law and as state law (interpreting civic behaviour in
terms of loyalty and patriotism). Human rights law conflicts with this because it
depends on a degree of civic vitality, and this may even clash with the law, certainly
with civil law. In turn, this raises a further challenge: not just whether the PRC is demo-
cratic or autocratic, but whether it supports a vibrant civic society that is both law-gov-
erned (by civil law) and able to give scope to a certain degree of autonomy. Harold
Laski refers to this as the ‘federalism’ of a state.119 In other words, bodies within the
state have their own specific autonomy. Until the CCP realises that this is not a threat
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to its political dominance, we will continue to see the clash between an international
human rights perspective and a state discourse that only pays lip service to human
rights.
Accordingly, this study underlines that, in the absence of rights enforcement mechan-
isms, and in light of the disjuncture in CCP and international civil society organisations’
UPR discourse, performativity and legitimation are a feature of contemporary rights prac-
tice in the PRC. In social theory terms, ‘performativity’ here is the ‘reiteration of a norm or
set of norms, and to the extent that it acquires an act-like status in the present, it conceals
or dissimulates the conventions of which it is a repetition’.120 In other words, through sub-
missions to the UPR the government of the PRC appears to embrace civil society engage-
ment and the promotion of religious freedoms in a way that advances political legitimacy –
or, the ‘public basis of justification and appeals to free public reason, and hence to all citi-
zens viewed as reasonable and rational’.121 Whereas, the present critical analysis of inter-
national CSO data shows that ‘legitimation’ applies. This refers to ‘communicative actions
aimed at managing the public’s perception that government actions are effective in pro-
moting their desired ends, whether that is in fact true’.122 Furthermore, analysis of the
state discourse reveals instrumentalism and institutional decoupling to characterise the
CCP’s UPR submissions. In short, the ruling elite espouses the upholding of religious free-
doms but acts to the contrary.
In turn, all of this presents key challenges to CSOs as well as the wider international
human rights community. It affirms the conclusion of leading analysis that
effective international regimes are likely to emerge only where they have deep roots in the
functional demands of groups in domestic and transnational society, as represented by the
domestic political institutions [such as civil society] that mediate between society and the
state.123
This study shows how, in the case of the PRC, practice presently falls short of this. The
functional demands of domestic groups are largely absent, and whilst the demands of
international CSOs are clear and vociferous, they remain unaddressed. Instead, the
ruling CCP elite continues to suppress discontent whilst at the same time administratively
fulfilling its UPR obligations. At the outset of the twenty-first century, this combination of
factors allows it to give primacy to retaining power and furthering what it dubs ‘a frame-
work of socialism with Chinese characteristics’ at the expense of contemporary religious
freedoms.
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